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*Wittgenstein On Rules
And Private Language*

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Wittgenstein: Rules, Grammar and
Necessity Springer

The Logical Must is an examination of
Ludwig Wittgenstein's philosophy of
logic, early and late, undertaken from an
austere naturalistic perspective
Penelope Maddy has called "Second
Philosophy." The Second Philosopher is a
humble but tireless inquirer who begins

her investigation of the world with
ordinary perceptual beliefs, moves from
there to empirical generalizations, then
to deliberate experimentation, and
eventually to theory formation and
confirmation. She takes this same
approach to logical truth, locating its
ground in simple worldly structures and
our knowledge of it in our basic cognitive
machinery, tuned by evolutionary
pressures to detect those structures
where they occur. In his early work
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus,

Wittgenstein also links the logical structure of representation with the structure of the world, but he includes one key unnaturalistic assumption: that the sense of our representations must be given prior to-independently of-facts about how the world is. When that assumption is removed, the general outlines of the resulting position come surprisingly close to the Second Philosopher's roughly empirical account. In his later discussions of logic in *Philosophical Investigations* and *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics*, Wittgenstein also rejects this earlier assumption in favor of a picture that arises in the wake of the famous rule-following considerations. Here Wittgenstein and the Second Philosopher operate in even closer

harmony-locating the ground of our logical practices in our interests, our natural inclinations and abilities, and very general features of the world-until the Second Philosopher moves to fill in the account with her empirical investigations of the world and cognition. At this point, Wittgenstein balks, but as a matter of personal animosity rather than philosophical principle.

Wittgenstein Cambridge University Press
This text presents an introduction to the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, the only book Wittgenstein published during his lifetime. Morris introduces & analyses the brief & sometimes cryptic text, including Wittgenstein's life, the background to the *Tractatus*, & the importance of Wittgenstein's work in philosophy today.

Wittgenstein, Rules, and Normativity

Oxford University Press

No other recent book in Anglophone philosophy has attracted as much criticism and has found so few friends as Saul Kripke's "Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language". Amongst its critics, one finds the very top of the philosophical profession. Yet, it is rightly counted amongst the books that students of philosophy, at least in the Anglo-American world, have to read at some point in their education.

Enormously influential, it has given rise to debates that strike at the very heart of contemporary philosophy of mind and language. In this major new interpretation, Martin Kusch defends Kripke's account against the numerous weighty objections that have been put

forward over the past twenty years and argues that none of them is decisive. He shows that many critiques are based on misunderstandings of Kripke's reasoning; that many attacks can be blocked by refining and developing Kripke's position; and that many alternative proposals turn out either to be unworkable or to be disguised variants of the view they are meant to replace. Kusch argues that the apparent simplicity of Kripke's text is deceptive and that a fresh reading gives Kripke's overall argument a new strength.

Wittgenstein SUNY Press

This third volume of the monumental commentary on Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* covers sections 243-427, which constitute the heart of the book. Like the previous

volumes, it consists of philosophical essays and exegesis. The thirteen essays cover all the major themes of this part of Wittgenstein's masterpiece: the private language arguments, privacy, avowals and descriptions, private ostensive definition, criteria, minds and machines, behavior and behaviorism, the self, the inner and the outer, thinking, consciousness, and the imagination. The exegesis clarifies and evaluates Wittgenstein's arguments, drawing extensively on all the unpublished papers, examining the evolution of his ideas in manuscript sources and definitively settling many controversies about the interpretation of the published text. This commentary, like its predecessors, is indispensable for the study of Wittgenstein and is

essential reading for students of the philosophy of mind. A fourth and final volume, entitled Wittgenstein: Mind and Will will complete the commentary.

Defending Husserl Routledge

Clearly and engagingly written, this volume is vital reading for students of philosophy and sociology, and anyone interested in Wittgenstein's later thought. David Bloor provides a challenging and informative evaluation of Wittgenstein's account of rules and rule-following. Arguing for a collectivist reading, Bloor offers the first consistent sociological interpretation of Wittgenstein's work for many years.

Ludwig Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations Routledge

In this textbook, Michael Morris offers a critical introduction to the central issues

of the philosophy of language. Each chapter focusses on one or two texts which have had a seminal influence on work in the subject, and uses these as a way of approaching both the central topics and the various traditions of dealing with them. Texts include classic writings by Frege, Russell, Kripke, Quine, Davidson, Austin, Grice and Wittgenstein. Theoretical jargon is kept to a minimum and is fully explained whenever it is introduced. The range of topics covered includes sense and reference, definite descriptions, proper names, natural-kind terms, *de re* and *de dicto* necessity, propositional attitudes, truth-theoretical approaches to meaning, radical interpretation, indeterminacy of translation, speech acts, intentional theories of meaning, and scepticism

about meaning. The book will be invaluable to students and to all readers who are interested in the nature of linguistic meaning.

Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language Oxford University Press

In this new introduction to a classic philosophical text, David Stern examines Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations*. He gives particular attention to both the arguments of the *Investigations* and the way in which the work is written, especially the role of dialogue in the book. While he concentrates on helping the reader to arrive at his or her own interpretation of the primary text, he also provides guidance to the unusually wide range of existing interpretations, and to the reasons why the *Investigations* have

inspired such a diversity of readings. Wittgenstein and the Philosophy of Mind Princeton University Press
 This text offers major re-evaluation of Wittgenstein's thinking. It is a collection of essays that presents a significantly different portrait of Wittgenstein. The essays clarify Wittgenstein's modes of philosophical criticism and shed light on the relation between his thought and different philosophical traditions and areas of human concern. With essays by Stanley Cavell, James Conant, Cora Diamond, Peter Winch and Hilary Putnam, we see the emergence of a new way of understanding Wittgenstein's thought. This is a controversial collection, with essays by highly regarded Wittgenstein scholars that may change the way we look at

Wittgenstein's body of work.

An Investigation of Kripke's Exposition, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language Routledge

This is a volume of original essays on key aspects of John Searle's philosophy of language. It examines Searle's work in relation to current issues of central significance, including internalism versus externalism about mental and linguistic content, truth-conditional versus non-truth-conditional conceptions of content, the relative priorities of thought and language in the explanation of intentionality, the status of the distinction between force and sense in the theory of meaning, the issue of meaning scepticism in relation to rule-following, and the proper characterization of 'what is said' in

relation to the semantics/pragmatics distinction. Written by a distinguished team of contemporary philosophers, and prefaced by an illuminating essay by Searle, the volume aims to contribute to a deeper understanding of Searle's work in philosophy of language, and to suggest innovative approaches to fundamental questions in that area.

Kripke's Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language at 40 Cambridge University Press

This accessible and lucidly written guide introduces the student of Wittgenstein to his most important work, the *Philosophical Investigations* and assesses its relationship to contemporary philosophy.

John Searle's Philosophy of Language
Routledge

This is the second volume of analytical commentary on Wittgenstein's masterpiece, the *Philosophical Investigations*. Like the first, it consists of philosophical essays and critical exegesis. The six essays deal comprehensively with various themes in Wittgenstein's philosophy: the relationship between his mathematics and his philosophy of mind; his conception of grammar and rules of grammar; the relation between a rule and what accords with a rule; the characterization of rule-following as mastery of a technique manifest in practice; his notion of a form of life, and of agreement in definitions and judgements; a comprehensive investigation into his account of logical and mathematical necessity and other

topics.

Wittgenstein, Rules, and Normativity
OUP Oxford

Taking Wittgenstein at His Word is an experiment in reading organized around a central question: What kind of interpretation of Wittgenstein's later philosophy emerges if we adhere strictly to his claims that he is not in the business of presenting and defending philosophical theses and that his only aim is to expose persistent conceptual misunderstandings that lead to deep philosophical perplexities? Robert Fogelin draws out the therapeutic aspects of Wittgenstein's later work by closely examining his account of rule-following and how he applies the idea in the philosophy of mathematics. The first of the book's two parts focuses on rule-

following, Wittgenstein's "paradox of interpretation," and his naturalistic response to this paradox, all of which are persistent and crucial features of his later philosophy. Fogelin offers a corrective to the frequent misunderstanding that the paradox of interpretation is a paradox about meaning, and he emphasizes the importance of Wittgenstein's often undervalued appeals to natural responses. The second half of the book examines how Wittgenstein applies his reflections on rule-following to the status of mathematical propositions, proofs, and objects, leading to remarkable, demystifying results. Taking Wittgenstein at His Word shows that what Wittgenstein claims to be doing and what he actually does are much

closer than is often recognized. In doing so, the book underscores fundamental—but frequently underappreciated—insights about Wittgenstein's later philosophy.

The Logical Must Routledge

These new studies of Wittgenstein's 'Tractatus' represent a significant step beyond recent polemical debate. They cover a wide range of themes, and show that close investigation into the composition of the work, and into the various influences on it, has much to yield in revealing the complexity and fertility of Wittgenstein's early thought.

Wittgenstein's Private Language

Taylor & Francis US

In *Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language*, Saul Kripke presents a controversial skeptical argument, which

he attributes to Wittgenstein's interlocutor in the *Philosophical Investigations* [PI]. The argument purports to show that there are no facts that correspond to what we mean by our words. Kripke maintains, moreover, that the conclusion of Wittgenstein's so-called private language argument is a corollary of results Wittgenstein establishes in §§137-202 of PI concerning the topic of following-a-rule, and not the conclusion of an independently developed argument in §§243ff of PI, as most commentators take it to be. In this work, I assess Kripke's skeptical argument both in its own right, and as an interpretation of the rule-following sections of PI. In its own right, I try to show that it is critically flawed. However, as an interpretation of the rule-following

sections of PI, I try to show that it is essentially correct. I do this by showing that Kripke's interpretation squares with and supports the metaphilosophical framework developed by Wittgenstein in §§107-136 of PI, which immediately precedes his remarks on following-a-rule. *Reference and Existence* Oxford University Press

What is the nature of a conceptual scheme? Are there alternative conceptual schemes? If so, are some more justifiable or correct than others? The later Wittgenstein already addresses these fundamental philosophical questions under the general rubric of "grammar" and the question of its "arbitrariness"--and does so with great subtlety. This book explores Wittgenstein's views on these questions.

Part I interprets his conception of grammar as a generalized (and otherwise modified) version of Kant's transcendental idealist solution to a puzzle about necessity. It also seeks to reconcile Wittgenstein's seemingly inconsistent answers to the question of whether or not grammar is arbitrary by showing that he believed grammar to be arbitrary in one sense and non-arbitrary in another. Part II focuses on an especially central and contested feature of Wittgenstein's account: a thesis of the diversity of grammars. The author discusses this thesis in connection with the nature of formal logic, the limits of language, and the conditions of semantic understanding or access. Strongly argued and clearly written, this book will appeal not only to philosophers

but also to students of the human sciences, for whom Wittgenstein's work holds great relevance.

"A" Critique of Saul Kripke's

"Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language" John Wiley & Sons

Stephen Mulhall presents a detailed critical commentary on sections 243-315 of Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations*: the famous remarks on 'private language'. In so doing, he makes detailed use of Stanley Cavell's interpretations of these remarks; and relates disputes about how to interpret this aspect of Wittgenstein's later philosophy to a recent, highly influential controversy about how to interpret Wittgenstein's early text, the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, by drawing and testing out a distinction between

resolute and substantial understandings of the related notions of grammar, nonsense and the imagination. The book is concerned throughout to elucidate Wittgenstein's philosophical method, and to establish the importance of the form or style of his writing to the proper application of this method.

Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Wittgenstein and the Tractatus Logico-philosophicus Harvard University Press

Based on a conference held in June 2007 at the University of California Santa Cruz.

Cambridge University Press
David Heyd's study will stimulate philosophers to recognise the importance of the rather neglected topic of the distinctiveness of supererogation

and the difficulty of accounting for it, and to take a fresh critical look at their theories in the light of its singular importance.

A Sceptical Guide to Meaning and Rules
Routledge

Reference and Existence, Saul Kripke's John Locke Lectures for 1973, can be read as a sequel to his classic Naming and Necessity. It confronts important issues left open in that work -- among them, the semantics of proper names and natural kind terms as they occur in fiction and in myth; negative existential statements; the ontology of fiction and myth (whether it is true that fictional characters like Hamlet, or mythical kinds like bandersnatches, might have existed). In treating these questions, he makes a number of methodological

observations that go beyond the framework of his earlier book -- including the striking claim that fiction cannot provide a test for theories of reference and naming. In addition, these lectures provide a glimpse into the transition to the pragmatics of singular reference that dominated his influential paper, Speaker's Reference and Semantic Reference -- a paper that helped reorient linguistic and philosophical semantics. Some of the themes have been worked out in later writings by other philosophers -- many influenced by typescripts of the lectures in circulation - - but none have approached the careful, systematic treatment provided here. The virtuosity of Naming and Necessity -- the colloquial ease of the tone, the dazzling, on-the-spot formulations, the logical

structure of the overall view gradually emerging over the course of the lectures -- is on display here as well.

Wittgenstein and the Limits of Language

Oxford University Press

This book offers two novel claims about Wittgenstein's views and methods on perception as explored in the *Philosophical Investigations*. The first is an interpretive claim about Wittgenstein: that his views on sensation and perception, including his critique of private language, have their roots in his reflections on sense-datum theories and on what Hymers calls the misleading metaphor of phenomenal space. The second is a major philosophical claim:

that Wittgenstein's critique of the misleading metaphor of phenomenal space is of ongoing relevance to current debates concerning first-person authority and the problem of perception because we are still tempted to draw inferences about the phenomenal that only apply to the physical. Many contemporary discussions of these topics are thus premised on the very confusions Wittgenstein sought to dispel. This book will appeal to Wittgenstein scholars who are interested in the *Philosophical Investigations* and to philosophers of perception who may think that Wittgenstein's views are mistaken, irrelevant, or already adequately appreciated.

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